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Abstract: We designed a field experiment involving real payments to elicit farmers’ risk 
preferences. Farmers are a very interesting sample to study since risk has always played an 
important role in agricultural producers’ decisions. Besides, European farmers may face more 
risky situations in the future. In this context, it is very important for any economic analysis 
focusing on agriculture to correctly assess farmers’ behaviour in the face of different sources 
of risk. We test for two descriptions of farmers’ behaviour: expected utility and cumulative 
prospect theory. We use two elicitation methods based on the procedures of Holt and Laury 
(2002) and Tanaka et al. (2010) on a sample of 30 French farmers. The experiment consists in 
asking subjects to make series of choices between two lotteries with varying probabilities and 
outcomes. We estimate parameters describing farmers’ risk preferences derived from 
structural models. We find farmers are slightly risk averse in the expected utility framework. 
In the cumulative prospect theory frame, we find farmers display either loss aversion or 
probability weighting, tending to overweight small probabilities and to underweight high 
probabilities. In our study, expected utility is not a good description of farmers’ behaviour 
towards risk. 
 
Keywords: Risk Attitudes, Field Experiment, Farming. 
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1. Background and motivation 
 
Risk has always played an important role in agricultural producers’ decisions. Besides, 
European farmers may face more risky situations in the future for different reasons. In 
particular farm production risks may increase due for example to tighter environmental 
regulations and to the effects of climatic change. The variability of European farm price is 
also likely to be greater in the future due to the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy. 
In this context, it is very important for any economic analysis focusing on agriculture to 
correctly assess farmers’ behaviour in the face of these different sources of risk. 
Recent contributions in the field of experimental economics may help to better assess this 
farmer behaviour. This approach enables to elicit risk attitudes both in the standard 
framework of expected utility and in the framework of alternative theories (Holt and Laury, 
2002; Harrison and Rutström, 2008, 2009; Andersen et al., 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010). 
 
We designed a field experiment to test for two descriptions of farmers’ behaviour: expected 
utility and cumulative prospect theory. We also test for the impact of context (output price 
risk and yield risk) on risk aversion parameters. We use two elicitation methods based on the 
procedures of Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka et al. (2010) on a sample of 30 French 
farmers. The experiment consists in asking subjects to make series of choices between two 
lotteries with varying probabilities and outcomes. We estimate parameters describing farmers’ 
risk preferences derived from structural models. We find farmers are slightly risk averse in the 
expected utility framework and display loss aversion and probability weighting 
(overweighting of small probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities). In our study, 
expected utility is not a good description of farmers’ behaviour towards risk. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section (section 2), we describe the empirical 
models derived from structural models. In section 3, we describe the field experiment. In 
section 4, results are presented and discussed. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Empirical models 
 
Following Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Andersen et al. (2010), we use structural 
modelling to estimate risk aversion parameters for the farmers in our sample. 
 
2.1. Estimation of a structural model assuming expected utility theory 
 
In the context of expected utility theory, we elicit a parameter (r) describing risk attitude using 















The coefficient of constant relative risk aversion is the parameter  ( ) . = - xx x r x u u . This leads 
to the following values for r according to risk attitudes: r>0 if individual is risk averse, r=0 if 
individual is risk neutral and r<0 if individual is risk loving. 
 
In the experiment, farmers faced series of lottery choices j where a choice was made between 
two lotteries A and B:  ( ) ( ) { } , , ; , ,
A A B B
j H L j H L p y y p y y . Lottery A (resp. B) offers a high outcome   4
A
H y  (resp. 
B
H y ) with probability  j p  and a low outcome 
A
L y  (resp. 
B
L y ) with probability 1- j p . 
Lottery B has more variable payoffs than lottery A. 
 
For individual i and for a given lottery  { } , Î k A B , the expected utility writes:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 = ´ + - ´
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i j i H j i L EU p u y p u y  
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It provides the rule for individual i choosing lottery B. We model the decision as a discrete 
choice model (from here, we drop subscript i to simplify notations). We consider a latent 
variable 
* e = Ñ + y EU  that describes the decision to choose lottery B. We assume e  follows 
a standard normal distribution with zero mean and variance s . 
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The probability to choose lottery B is: 
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where  ( ) F i  is the standard normal distribution function. 
 
We estimate the constant relative risk aversion parameter and the variance s  using maximum 
likelihood. The log likelihood function writes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln : , ln 1 ln 1 1 s s   = F Ñ ´ = + -F Ñ ´ = -   ∑ i i
i
L r y EU y EU y X I I  
 
where  ( ) i I  is the indicator function,  1 = i y  when lottery B is chosen and  1 = - i y  when lottery 
A is chosen, X is a vector of individual characteristics. 
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2.2. Estimation of a structural model assuming cumulative prospect theory 
 
Under cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), individuals display 
differing behaviours in the gain and loss domain. For individual i and for a given lottery 
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where a  is the concavity of the utility function and l  is a loss aversion parameter. 
 
Probabilities are transformed according to the following weighting probability function 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992): 
 
( ) ( )
1
1
g g g g p   = + -   p p p p  
 
where g  is a parameter describing the shape of the weighting probability function.   1 g <  
(resp.  1 g > ) implies overweighting (resp. underweighting) of small probabilities and 
underweighting (resp. overweighting) of high probabilities. 
 
The specifications used in this section collapse to the expected utility specification if  1 l =  
and  1 g = . 
 
The structural specification of individual decisions under cumulative prospect theory follows 
the same pattern as with the expected utility specification. For individual i and for a given 
lottery  { } , Î k A B , the prospective utility writes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 p p = ´ + - ´
k k k
i j i H j i L PU p v y p v y  
 
We estimate three parameters (a , l  and g ) and the variance s  using maximum likelihood. 
The log likelihood function writes: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln : , ln 1 ln 1 1 s s   = F Ñ ´ = + -F Ñ ´ = -   ∑ i i
i
L r y PU y PU y X I I  
 
where  ( ) i I  is the indicator function,  1 = i y  when lottery B is chosen and  1 = - i y  when lottery 
A is chosen, X is a vector of individual characteristics. 
 
We now turn to describing the field experiment. 
 
 
3. Field experiment and sample description 
 
We first describe the field experiment and then the characteristics of the sample.   6
 
3.1. Field experiment description 
 
The field experiment took place in the summer 2010. Participants were face-to-face 
interviewed. We used a multiple price list procedure (see Harrison and Rutström, 2008 for a 
review). We used two elicitation series we call HL series and TCN series based on the papers 
of Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka et al. (2010) on a sample of 30 French farmers. The 
experiment consists in asking subjects to make series of 65 choices between two lotteries with 
varying probabilities and outcomes (choice situations 1 to 30 correspond to the HL series and 
choice situations 31 to 65 to the TCN series). Choices were presented in the format of Figure 
1 where playing a lottery was framed as turning a wheel (like in the well known Wheel of 
Fortune TV show). The highest potential earning in the experiment is 385€ and the lowest is a 










Wheel A  Wheel B  I prefer 
turning… 







Wheel A ￿ 
 
 
Wheel B ￿ 







Wheel A ￿ 
 
 
Wheel B ￿ 
….           





Wheel A ￿ 
 
 
Wheel B ￿ 
Figure 1. Example of choices faced by subjects in the field experiment: situations 1 to 10 based on Holt 
and Laury (2002) 
 
Individual choices between lotteries enable an estimation of the parameters we described in 
section 2. There were three variations as compared to the papers of Holt and Laury (2002) and 
Tanaka et al. (2010). First, in the HL series, the figures corresponding to gains are a hundred 
times higher than in the baseline treatment of Holt and Laury (2002) (1.65$ becomes 165€). 
Second, in the TCN series, the figures corresponding to gains and losses are 5,000 times 
lower than the experiment of Tanaka et al. (2010) (40,000 Vietnamese dongs become 8€). 
Third, the HL series is played three times to test for pure framing effects: no context as in 
Holt and Laury (2002) (probability of earning a given amount of money), price context 
(probability of selling 10% of soft wheat production at a certain price per ton), and margin   7
context (probability of getting a certain margin with a 15% fertilizer reduction). Table 1 
shows the characteristics of each of the 65 choice situations. 
 
Choice situations  Series  Reference  Framing  Domain 
1-10 
HL series 
Holt and Laury (2002) 
Baseline*100  No  Gain 
11-20  Holt and Laury (2002) 
Baseline*100  Price risk frame  Gain 
21-30  Holt and Laury (2002) 
Baseline*100  Yield risk frame  Gain 
31-58 
TCN series  Tanaka et al. (2010) 
Baseline/5,000  No 
Gain 
59-65  Loss 
Table 1. Choice situations faced by farmers in the field experiment 
 
The incentive of the experiment is controlled by randomly drawing the choice situation (thus 
the lottery chosen by the participant) that will be played for earnings. Then, out of the 30 
participants, 3 participants were randomly drawn for real payments. All participants received 
a show-up fee (20€) to cover their expense for coming to the experiment and to potentially 
cover their expenses in the loss domain.  
 
3.2. Sample description 
 
We collected questionnaires from 30 farmers. Table 2 gives summary statistics. Farmers in 
the group are relatively well educated. They perceive their production activities as very risky 
in terms of output prices. Then, risks related to input prices and climatic risks are considered 
as very important.  
 
Variable  Description  #Obs  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
Variables describing farmers         
AGE  Age (in years)  30  41.90  9.36  23  56 
EDUC  =1 if “baccalaureat” diploma or higher and 0 otherwise  30  0.70  0.47  0  1 
Variables describing farms 
SAU  UAA (hectares)  30  176.73  61.52  74  297 
ETS  =1 if company and 0 otherwise  30  0.60  0.50  0  1 
GAEC  =1 if partnership and 0 otherwise  30  0.13  0.35  0  1 
Variables on farmers’ perception of risk in their production activity (1=not risky to 5=very risky) 
RISKPPROD  Perception of output price risk  30  4.60  0.67  3  5 
RISKPINT  Perception of input price risk  30  3.97  0.89  2  5 
RISKCLIM  Perception of climatic risk (yield)  30  3.63  1.10  2  5 
RISKCOM  Perception of output marketing risk  30  3.40  1.13  1  5 
RISKPOL  Perception of risk related to policies  30  3.00  1.31  1  5 
RISKTECH  Perception of technological risk  30  2.20  0.96  1  4 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
We present and discuss our results first in the framework of expected utility theory and then 
of the cumulative prospect theory. 
 
4.1. Econometric estimation of risk attitudes under expected utility theory 
 
We consider choice situations 1 to 58. As situations 59 to 65 involve losses and the CRRA 
utility function specification does not allow for “negative wealth”, we drop situations 59-65. 
Table 3 gives the maximum likelihood estimation results using clustering for individuals. We   8
estimate the CRRA parameter along with the variance. We allow for variance to vary as a 
function of the series (HL or TCN). A variable called TYPE enables us to get the impact of 




(1)  (2)  (3) 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
P>|z|  Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 




   
         
constant  3.768  0.000  3.732  0.000  3.711  0.000 
  (0.559)     (0.553)     (0.520)   
TYPE  5.811  0.000  5.987  0.000  5.788  0.000 
  (0.774)     (0.807)     (0.677)   
r 
                 
constant  0.125  0.203  0.114  0.251  0.133  0.198 
  (0.098)     (0.100)     (0.104)   
PRICEFRAME        0.009  0.792  -0.005  0.868 
        (0.033)     (0.033)   
MARGINFRAME        0.041  0.279  0.036  0.341 
        (0.038)     (0.038)   
EDUC              -0.070  0.137 
              (0.047)   
GAEC              0.054  0.448 
              (0.072)   
ETS              0.058  0.170 
             (0.042)   
#Observations    1740  1740  1740 
Log likelihood    -902.98 (ns)  -901.63 (ns)  -887.77 (ns) 
Table 3. ML estimation of CRRA parameter and variance under EUT – Situations 1 to 58 and clustering 
for individuals 
 
The estimated parameter, the constant in model (1), suggests small risk aversion in the sample 
(r=0.125>0). The risk preference parameter is elicited in three frames: no context, output price 
risk and yield risk. We control for framing effects by adding dummies (the reference is no 
frame) in model (2): PRICEFRAME equals one if output price risk frame and zero otherwise, 
and MARGINFRAME equals one if yield risk frame and zero otherwise. We find there are no 
significant framing effects. The constant gives an estimate of the CRRA parameter 
(r=0.114>0) when there is no context. Individuals are still risk averse but slightly less. 
 
We turn to studying the effects of farm’s and farmer’s characteristics on risk aversion in 
model (3). We use one variable describing the farmer (EDUC) and two variables describing 
the farm status (GAEC and ETS). The dummies for framing effects remain. The reference is 
no context and farmers without high school diploma, with farms with sole proprietorship. We 
find that the estimated CRRA parameter is now 0.133, which is a little higher but still not 
significant. Framing has still no significant effect on risk attitudes. More educated people tend 
to be less risk averse. Indeed, the variable EDUC has a negative effect on the CRRA 
parameter although not significantly (p=0.137). The status of the farm has no significant 
impact on attitudes towards risk. 
 
4.2. Econometric estimation of risk attitudes under CPT 
 
We now consider all choice situations (1 to 65). Using clustering for individuals, the 
estimation results are in Table 4. We present three models: baseline, with framing dummies, 
and with individual characteristics. We also test for parameters equality to one. Recall 





(4)  (5)  (6) 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
P>|z|  Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 





             
constant  3.229  0.000  1.910  0.020  1.371  0.336 
  (0.786)    (0.821)    (1.425)   
TYPE  4.964  0.000  3.527  0.001  2.391  0.139 
  (0.853)    (1.021)    (1.617)   
 
a  
             
constant  0.803  0.000  0.605  0.000  1.002  0.000 
  (0.115)    (0.136)    (0.105)   
PRICEFRAME      0.255  0.047  -0.089  0.252 
      (0.128)    (0.078)   
MARGINFRAME      0.301  0.027  -0.078  0.314 
      (0.137)    (0.077)   
EDUC          -0.004  0.962 
          (0.095)   
GAEC          -0.439  0.061 
          (0.234)   
ETS          -0.032  0.553 
          (0.054)   
 
l  
             
constant  2.489  0.000  2.111  0.000  0.041  0.994 
  (0.697)    (0.349)    (5.512)   
EDUC          1.740  0.000 
          (0.483)   
GAEC          0.594  0.914 
          (5.500)   
ETS          53.377  0.242 
          (45.586)   
 
g  
             
constant  1.036  0.000  0.884  0.000  0.048  0.000 
  (0.171)    (0.146)    (0.011)   
PRICEFRAME      -0.535  0.000  0.218  0.055 
      (0.096)    (0.114)   
MARGINFRAME      -0.599  0.000  0.187  0.039 
      (0.103)    (0.091)   
EDUC          0.025  0.429 
          (0.032)   
GAEC          0.531  0.000 
          (0.083)   
ETS          -0.010  0.233 
          (0.008)   
#Observations  1950  1950  1950 
Log likelihood  -1025.35 (ns)  -1013.07 (10%)  -1096.83 (1%) 
Hypotheses can be rejected? 
a :  constant=1  Yes (1%)  Yes (5%)  No 
l :  constant=1  Yes (5%)  Yes (5%)  No 
g :  constant=1  No  No  Yes (1%) 
Table 4. ML estimation of parameters and variance under cumulative prospect theory – Situations 1 to 65 
and clustering for individuals 
 
Let us discuss first the results on the constants in models (4) and (5). We find that the value 
function is concave in the gain domain and convex in the loss domain. The estimated a    10
parameter is 0.803 in model (4) and 0.605 in model (5). It is significantly different from one 
(chisq test: 2.94; p=0.086 in model (4) and chisq test: 8.52; p=0.004 in model (5)). We find 
that farmers in the sample exhibit loss aversion. The estimated l  parameter is 2.489 in model 
(4) and 2.111 in model (5) and is significantly higher than one (chisq test: 4.56; p=0.033 in 
model (4) and chisq test: 10.13; p=0.002 in model (5)). However, there is no significant 
evidence of probability weighing in both models. The estimated g  parameter is not 
significantly different from one (chisq test: 0.05; p=0.832 in model (4) and chisq test: 0.64; 
p=0.425 in model (5)). 
 
In model (5), we control for framing effects. Note that framing effects were introduced in the 
field experiment only in the gain domain. They are controlled for in the estimation only for 
the a  and g  equations. They appear to play a significant role. The price frame and the 
margin frame impact positively the curvature of the value function (5% significance) but 
negatively the probability weighing parameter (1% significance). Especially, farmers tend to 
overweight small probabilities and underweight high probabilities in the framing treatments. 
 
Finally, we add individual characteristics to explain the parameters in model (6). We find that 
the value function is linear in the gain and the loss domain. The estimated a  parameter is 
1.002 and is not significantly different from one (chisq test: 0; p=0.983). Contrary to the 
results of the previous models, when individual characteristics are controlled for, we find no 
evidence of loss aversion (chisq test: 0.03; p=0.862) but evidence of probability weighting 
(chisq test: 7280; p=0.000). Framing effects still significantly impact the probability 
weighting function but not the curvature of the value function. Now in a price or margin 
frame, farmers tend to overweight less small probabilities. Individual characteristics play a 
role in this. We find the status of the farm impacts the a  and g  parameters. We also find that 
education tends to increase loss aversion. 
 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
 
In the context of increasing risks in agriculture, we designed a field experiment involving real 
payments to elicit farmers’ risk preferences. We especially tested for two descriptions of 
farmers’ behaviour: expected utility and cumulative prospect theory. We use two elicitation 
methods based on the procedures of Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka et al. (2010) on a 
sample of 30 French farmers. We estimated parameters describing farmers’ risk preferences 
derived from structural models. We find farmers are slightly risk averse in the expected utility 
framework. In the cumulative prospect theory frame, we find farmers display either loss 
aversion or probability weighting, tending to overweight small probabilities and to 
underweight high probabilities. In our study, expected utility is not a good description of 
farmers’ behaviour towards risk. 
 
This study is a first step into a better understanding of farmers’ behaviour towards risky 
situations using recent advances in field experiments. Several characteristics of our study 
should be kept in mind however. First, we used the multiple price list procedure because it is 
easy to implement and to understand for subjects. It may however involve framing effects 
(suggesting the middle row and making clear the experiment objective) though Harrison and 
Rutström (2008) indicate the bias is not systematic. Second, our sample is small. We would 
need either to increase the number of choices made by subjects or to increase the number of 
subjects. The first proposition seems difficult to implement since asking for 65 choices was 
already a lot for subjects. We showed that the variance increased in the TCN series as   11
compared to the HL series. This may also be due to fatigue effects, the HL being played 
always first. Our study would benefit from increasing the number of interviewed farmers to 
better test for the effect of individual characteristics, to elicit individual parameters and to 
determine the effect of risk attitudes on behaviours such as production choices and insurance 
demand. Third, the loss domain is not easy to implement in the field. Indeed, one cannot ask 
participants in the experiment to pay the experimenter if the lottery involves a loss. This is 
resolved by the show-up fee. But, this fee in itself plays the role of an insurance mechanism. 
Moreover, the experiment implicitly sets the reference point in the cumulative prospect theory 
at a zero level. This is a hypothesis. Future study aims at working on these limitations and 
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